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of fact. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
AUDREY FORSMAN, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant,z 
-v- : 
GEORGE FORSMAN, : 
RONALD FLINDERS and 
DOES I through Xf : 
Defendants /Respondents , : 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC : 
SAFETY, NARCOTIC & LIQUOR Case No. 860430 
LAW ENFORCEMENT DIVISION, : 
P l a i n t i f f , : 
- v - : 
GEORGE LELAND FORSMAN, : 
D e f e n d a n t / C r o s s - C l a i m a n t . : 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
P l a i n t i f f was injured in an automobile accident and 
brought t h i s act ion against defendants for negl igence . The case 
was thereafter consol idated with an act ion f i l e d by the 
Department of Public Safety against p l a i n t i f f ' s husband for 
damages to the Department's v e h i c l e occurring in the same 
acc ident . Defendant Flinders was employed by and drove the 
veh i c l e owned by the Department. Defendant Forsman drove the 
v e h i c l e in which p l a i n t i f f was a passenger. 
On October 3 1 , 1985, the t r i a l court granted a summary 
judgment in favor of defendant Flinders because p l a i n t i f f f a i l e d 
t o f i l e the s tatutory not ice of claim without which her claim was 
barred by governmental immunity* The f inal order was entered on 
June 26, 1986. An order granting Express Determination and 
Express Direct ion was entered on July 23 , 1986 and p l a i n t i f f 
f i l e d a not ice of appeal on July 25, 1986. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
P l a i n t i f f ' s c la im i s barred by her f a i l u r e t o f i l e a 
timely and proper not ice of claim within the statutory time 
period. Defendant i s not estopped from claiming protect ion of 
the s t a t u t e under the circumstances of t h i s case where he made no 
f a l s e representat ions and no attempt was made by the State to 
l u l l p l a i n t i f f into a f a l s e sense of secur i ty or otherwise avoid 
l i a b i l i t y . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANT FLINDERS, A STATE 
EMPLOYEE, UNDER THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY 
ACT. 
P l a i n t i f f argues that the State should not have been 
granted a summary judgment on the bas i s of the Governmental 
Immunity Act but that p l a i n t i f f should have been allowed t o 
present evidence of estoppel at t r i a l . Under the circumstances 
of t h i s case , p l a i n t i f f ' s claim i s m e r i t l e s s . 
This court recent ly s ta ted that 
Summary judgment i s proper only "if the 
pleadings , depos i t i ons , answers to 
i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s , and admissions on f i l e , 
together with the a f f i d a v i t s , if any, show 
that there i s no genuine i s sue as t o any 
material f ac t and that the moving party i s 
e n t i t l e d t o a judgment as a matter of law." 
Utah R. Civ. P. 5 6 ( c ) ; Gadd v. Olson, Utah, 
685 P.2d 1041 (1984). Under the pert inent 
standard of review f we view the evidence in 
a l i g h t most favorable to the lo s ing party. 
Praper Bank and Trust Co. v. Lawson, Utah, 
675 P.2a 1174 (1983), and cases there c i t e d . 
Cox v. Utah Mortg. and Loan Corp., 716 P. 2d 783, 785 (Utah 1986) . 
Even viewing the evidence in the l i g h t most favorable to 
p l a i n t i f f , the t r i a l cour t ' s act ion was proper. 
There was uncontroverted evidence that p l a i n t i f f ' s 
inves t igator asked the State Div is ion of Personnel Management 
whether Mr. Flinders was a s t a t e employee and that someone at the 
Div is ion to ld the inves t igator that Mr. Flinders was not an 
employee (R. 208). There was a lso uncontroverted evidence that 
Mr. Fl inders was at a l l pert inent times a s t a t e employee and that 
he was employed by the Department of Public Safety at 4501 S. 
2700 W. in Sa l t lake City (R. 208) . Mr. Flinders provided t h i s 
address on the accident report form (R. 208). He a l so l i s t e d the 
State of Utah as being located at that address and as the 
insurance carrier (R. 39) . In s p i t e of these f a c t s , p l a i n t i f f 
did not f i l e a not ice of claim with any representat ive of the 
S t a t e . 
Utah Code Ann. S 63-30-12 (Rep. Vol. 1986) , bars claims 
aga ins t the State unless a not ice of claim i s f i l e d with the 
s t a t e agency concerned and the attorney general within one year. 
This language i s an unequivocal bar to further act ion absent 
compliance with i t s provis ions , c . f . Stahl v. Utah Transit 
Authority, 618 P.2d 480, 482 (Utah 1980). Moreover, the right to 
maintain an act ion against the State or i t s employee i s a purely 
statutory r ight . See Utah Code Ann. S 63-30-7 (Rep. Vol. 1986). 
"Where a r ight i s purely s tatutory and i s granted upon 
condi t ions , one who seeks t o enforce the r ight must by a l l e g a t i o n 
and proof bring himself within the condi t ions ." Cornwall v. 
frarsen, 571 P.2d 925, 926 (Utah 1977) , quoting Hamilton v. Sa l t 
Lake Ci ty , 99 Utah 362, 106 P.2d 1028 (1940). See a l so 
Scarborough v. Granite School D i s t . , 531 P.2d 480 (Utah 1975) . 
P l a i n t i f f does not contend that she in any form 
complied with the s tatutory not ice requirement. She argues only 
that the State should be estopped from asser t ing the protect ion 
of the s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s because an unrelated s t a t e employee 
to ld her that Fl inders was not a s t a t e employee. The 
circumstances of t h i s case are d i s t ingu i shab le from the cases 
c i t ed by p l a i n t i f f in support of her p o s i t i o n . In t h i s case , 
there was no timely writ ten not ice given to any s t a t e agency as 
had been done in Rice v. Granite School D i s t r i c t , 23 Utah 2d 22, 
456 P.2d 159 (1969). .See Scarborough, 531 P.2d at 482. Nor did 
anyone representing the S ta te assure p l a i n t i f f that her case 
would be s e t t l e d and thereby l u l l her in to a sense of f a l s e 
secur i ty as in Rice. Moreover, p l a i n t i f f was represented by 
counsel who presumably knew the consequences of f a i l i n g t o f i l e a 
proper not ice of claim should Mr. Fl inders turn out to be a s t a t e 
employee as he had represented. See Cornwall, 571 P. 2d at 927. 
Nothing prevented p l a i n t i f f from protect ing her right to maintain 
an ac t ion by f i l i n g a timely and proper not ice of claim with the 
S ta te a l l e g i n g that Mr. Fl inders was a s t a t e employee as he 
represented. I t would then have f a l l e n to the S ta te to admit or 
deny such a claim. If Mr. Fl inders was not an emplyeee, no harm 
could have resul ted from f i l i n g a not ice of claim based upon the 
accident report form and y e t , p l a i n t i f f ' s claim would have been 
protected in the event Fl inders to ld the truth about h i s 
employment. 
Certainly , t h i s case i s not s imilar to Myers v. 
McDonald, 635 P.2d 84 (Utah 1981) where the p l a i n t i f f did not 
even know a wrongful death cause of act ion ex i s t ed against anyone 
because they did not even know about the death of the ir ward. In 
that case , the defendant sought to prevent inquiry into the 
ward's death to avoid discovery of the decedent's i d e n t i t y and 
actua l ly made f a l s e statements about the v i c t i m ' s i d e n t i t y . 
Here, there i s no evidence that the State instructed i t s 
unident i f ied employee to mislead anyone about the i d e n t i t y of 
persons who work for the State to avoid l i a b i l i t y in th i s case. 
In f a c t , there was unrefuted evidence of the S t a t e ' s pol icy to 
respond truthfu l ly to inqu ir i e s about whether an individual i s a 
s t a t e employee (R. 150, 208) . Although, they would not d i s c l o s e 
that the person worked as a narcot ics agent. Nor was there 
evidence that the unident i f ied State employee acted to conceal 
the truth from p l a i n t i f f purposely to avoid any l i a b i l i t y of the 
State for p l a i n t i f f ' s i n j u r i e s . 
In t h i s case , unlike Vincent v. Sal t Lake County, 5 83 
P.2d 105 (Utah 1978), p l a i n t i f f could not have reasonably r e l i e d 
upon the unknown s t a t e employee's information that Fl inders did 
not work for the State when Fl inders himself reported that he did 
and when the s teps necessary to perfect a poss ib le claim were so 
e a s i l y accomplished and f a i l u r e to perfect resu l ted in a 
permanent bar to her claim. Moreover, when p l a i n t i f f discovered 
her e r r o r , she d id not attempt t o c o r r e c t t h e error by g i v i n g 
n o t i c e of her c l a i m w i t h i n one year from the a l l e g e d d i s c o v e r y of 
t h e S t a t e ' s m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n as did t h e p l a i n t i f f in Vincent* 
Because p l a i n t i f f i n t h i s case does not f i t the mold of 
p l a i n t i f f s who have s u c c e s s f u l l y c la imed e s t o p p e l in governmental 
immunity c a s e s , and i s more l i k e t h o s e who have n o t , the lower 
cour t proper ly granted summary judgment. There was no genuine 
i s s u e of m a t e r i a l f a c t on the e s t o p p e l i s s u e t h a t warranted a 
t r i a l on t h e m e r i t s . This Court shou ld , t h e r e f o r e , a f f i rm t h e 
t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n . 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons s t a t e d above , defendant F l i n d e r s 
r e q u e s t s t h i s Court t o a f f i rm the lower c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n t o grant 
him summary judgment. 
DATED t h i s J2f/\ day of January, 1 9 8 7 . 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
y'/ 
SANDRA L.^SJOGRJ 
Assistant Attorney General 
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